The Emasculation of America

The Case Against Feminism:

EmasculationOfAmerica.com
Text Box: First Amendment Legal Precedents in Education Doug Baker – June 10, 2005 (R) Court ruling’s edited by Peter Irons (1997) The First Amendment: May It Please the Court. Teachers versus Students: The following precedent-setting rulings respond to specific issues related to student’s rights to freedom-speech. In neither case did the Court have the opportunity to hear arguments – and thus carefully consider the vast differences in the status and role of students and teachers. Yet in Tinker—in what seems only a secondary or after thought—the Court specifically added the words “and teacher’s” to some sections of the ruling; which then is carried over into Hazelwood. But, all one can conclude for certain is that the Court intends teachers to be treated similar to students with respect to the exercise of free-speech as narrowly confined the specific issues addressed in both cases. And even that might legitimately be subject to revision. Unlike students, teachers are neither just “citizen’s” (Tinker) nor “an immature audience” (Hazelwood). They are life-experienced adults, educated professionals, employees of their schools, and public servants as well as citizens. In other words, teachers’ private rights are circumscribed by their role as school officials; agents’ delegated prescribed duties with respect to students; representatives of their employers and culture. Thus, teachers have fiduciary responsibilities, not only with respect to the institutions the serve, but also with respect to their students and to the public-at-large. As mentioned in my letter of March 24, a teacher’s role is like that of journalists in the media; and perhaps also like that of guards in a prison or orderlies in an asylum. Do reporters have the right to say anything they please in a newspaper or on the air? Of course not! Would employers be held liable if journalists violated the civil rights of any other currently protected group? You bet! Are the guards in one of our prisons – much less Abu Grabe – or the attendants in an asylum free to say anything discriminatory they please to inmates? No way! Hazelwood powerfully reinforces these observations. For example, could a teacher-employee get away with saying, “Everybody knows – and research proves – Blacks are less intelligent than whites; so few of them ever get any where.” Could they write “Blacks can’t be counted on; they are all criminals (or lazy etc.).” Journalists, guards, orderlies, and thus teachers have similar relationships with their employers and, through them, with the public as well. In fact, Hazelwood makes it clear that schoolrooms are even more sacrosanct. We haven’t turned over our asylums to the orderlies, our prisons to the guards, or the media to reporters. Teachers are in positions of far greater sensitivity and trust; we certainly would not want to turnover our schools to them so they could say and do whatever they please with students. The Supreme Court – due to specifics issues addressed in each case – did not have the opportunity to thoroughly ponder such considerations in any detail in either Tinker or Hazelwood. And the latter case makes it undeniably clear that the court would rule that neither teacher’s nor administrators have unlimited or unilateral control of the content or implementation of classroom public education; the former operates under the authority of the latter, who in turn functions under the auspices of the state (i.e. public). Tinker vs. Des Moines (393 U.S. 503—1969): Tinker addresses the issue of students wearing arm bands in the classroom as a form of silent political protest. The case establishes the principle that students have the right to symbolic, non-disruptive political expression, provided it does not infringe on the rights of others. “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost fifty years.” “Speaking through Justice Jackson, the Court said: ‘The 14th Amendment… protects the citizens against the State itself and all of its creatures—Board of Education not excepted… That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government…’” (Note: By teaching Feminist belief system and shrewd manipulation of facts, isn't this exactly what any instructor or institution teaching such information is in fact doing – suffocating student’s freedom-to-think, if not actually brainwashing them?) “On the other hand, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools…Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.” The Court concluded by stating, “In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved…” (Note that “and teachers” is not specifically included in the language of the summation. And are Feminism’s effects totalitarian?) It is certainly a matter of interpretation, but as I read the above, the Court would almost certainly rule that, while functioning in their roles as school officials, teachers (as well as administrators) would be prohibited from treating topically naïve and trusting students as “closed-circuit recipients;” prohibited from teaching just any psychosocial, economic, political, and cultural views they might choose; prohibited from violating the legal rights of students - i.e. discriminating against or violating the civil rights of Blacks or Hispanics, women, or other protected groups, and thus men – in any public classroom. In sum, this ruling does nothing more than authorize teachers, in their role as “citizens,” to quietly and non-disruptively express their sociopolitical views at school, provided doing so does not violate the civil rights of others – in this case, that they do not discriminate against male students. Thus Feminist instructors are free to wear tee-shirts stating “Men abuse women and are rapists.” But Tinker does not give teachers an unlimited or unilateral license to go about fabricating data supporting such discriminatory contentions; to teach their personal social ideals and political beliefs to topically innocent and vulnerable students entrusted to their tutelage; to offer their false/discriminatory data as though they were objective scientific facts or empirical truths. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: This case substantially restricted the First Amendment rights of students as defined in Tinker. It is vital to note that teacher’s rights to free-speech is not addressed in this ruling; instead, their role is incorporated with that the administration; collectively referred to as “educators.” However, since Tinker remains germane and embraced teachers in its verbiage, the principles applied to students in this case would prevail upon teachers, at least equally – if not requiring that they satisfy a far more stringent set of standards and extensive constraints upon their right to free-speech. Hazelwood deals with the extent to which educators may censor and control students with respect to the content of high school newspapers. The case establishes that administrators are free to edit and cut articles; or, stated in the reverse, that student journalists do not have the right to publish information without censorship. The Court found, “the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,’ and must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.’ A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not censor such speech outside the school.” “The question of whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech... is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on school premises. The latter question concerns educators’ authority over school sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members…” “Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over… to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, the school may… ‘disassociate itself,’ not only from speech that would ‘substantially interfere with (its) work… or impinge upon the rights of other students’, but also from speech that is, for example ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased and prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences. A school must be able to set high standards for student speech that is disseminated under its auspices, standards that may be higher than those demanded by some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers… and (schools) may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards.” “…a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the… audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics… A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shard values of a civilized social order,’ or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the school would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.” “Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker… need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression. Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as they their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” How could anyone read these rulings and conclude that teacher’s or school’s rights to free-speech entitles either of them to blatantly promote a prescribed set of political beliefs or flagrantly distort reality in the process of discriminating against men?